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1. Introduction
In his 1949 essay “The Land Ethic,” Aldo Leopold – a 20th century forester, hunter, 
game/wildlife manager, and professor who has been very influential in environmental 
ethics and conservation biology – famously stated:
A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the 
biotic community.  It is wrong when it tends otherwise (Leopold 1949, 224-225; 
emphasis added).
This passage, and Leopold’s land ethic more generally, implies that the biotic 
community is a locus of direct moral obligation, or even, some argue, an entity with 
intrinsic value (Callicott 1987, 2013).  But what did Leopold mean by “biotic 
community”?  Interestingly, Leopold considered the biotic community to include not 
only biotic components but also abiotic components: “soils, waters, plants, and animals, 
or collectively: the land” (Leopold 1949, 204).1  So, “biotic community” is a somewhat 
misleading term; land community, another term that Leopold employs in “The Land 
Ethic,” seems more appropriate (and thus I will use it for the remainder of this essay).
Some authors have raised concerns about making the land community the ethical locus 
of the land ethic, regardless of what we call it.  Kristin Shrader-Frechette sums up these 
worries well:
Nor is it obvious how to define the system at issue. The ecological problem of 
defining the system at issue is analogous to the economic problem of defining a 
theory of social choice and choosing some “whole” that aggregates or represents 
numerous individual choices.  Defining an ecological “whole” to which Callicott 
and Leopold can refer is especially problematic, both because the biologists (e.g., 
Clements, Elton, Forbes) cited by Callicott to explicate his [Leopold’s] views are 
no longer accepted by most contemporary scientists as having correct views 
about ecological communities, and because the contemporary variant of 
Clements’s position, the GAIA hypothesis, has been rejected by most ecologists 
as an unproved metaphor or mere speculation.  At best it is an hypothesis.  They 
admit the scientific facts of interconnectedness and coevolution on a small scale, 
but they point out that particular ecosystems and communities do not persist 
through time.  Hence, there is no clear referent for the alleged “dynamic 
stability” of an ecosystem or community (Shrader-Frechette 1996: 60).
1
1 Indeed, in an earlier work, Leopold clarifies that he uses the term ‘biota’ to include “not only plants and 
animals, but soils and waters as well” (1939, 727).  
From this passage, I glean the following concerns:
(i) It is not clear how to define a land community, which Shrader-Frechette seems to 
think of in terms of an ecological community or an ecosystem.
(ii) The concept of “land community,” at least as explicated by J. Baird Callicott in 
his earlier work,2 is outdated and rejected by contemporary science, and the 
closest contemporary view has also been rejected by most contemporary 
scientists.
(iii) Particular land communities are not things that persist through time
(iv) Thus, there is no clear referent for the land ethic and the stability that it seeks to 
promote.
Indeed, even Callicott, who has been called the “leading philosophical exponent of Aldo 
Leopold’s land ethic” (Norton 2002, 127), thinks that particular land communities 
cannot be clearly identified, adding to Shrader-Frechette’s list of concerns the following:
(v) The boundaries of communities and ecosystems are not fixed by nature, but 
rather, determined by the scientific questions that ecologists pose (see, e.g., 
Callicott 2013, Eliot 2013).
Some of these concerns can be understood as concerns that the land community is not 
an individual.  Yet Leopold did seem to think that the land community was an 
individual, even if he didn’t use the word “individual” specifically; for example, in 
some essays (e.g., Leopold [1923] 1991, [1934] 1991, [1944] 1991) he explored the idea 
that the community is an organism.  In “The Land Ethic” (1949) he seemed to de-
emphasize (although not eliminate) his characterization of communities as organisms, 
but even there he still maintained that the members of communities are interdependent; 
referred to soils, waters, plants, and animals collectively; and spoke of the organization 
(or, in degraded situations, the disorganization) of land. Relatedly, in an unpublished 
essay written in 1944, Leopold “sketch[ed] the concept of land-as-a-whole” (Leopold 
[1944] 1991, 310), described land-health (or land-illness) as an attribute of the 
community as a whole, and suggested that “the components of land have a collective as 
well as separate welfare” (Leopold [1944] 1991, 316).  These all seem to be ways of 
getting at what we would today term as “individuality.” Can these views of Leopold’s 
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2 See Callicott (2013) for a revised and updated account.
be defended, or is the land ethic undercut because the concept of “land community” 
cannot be characterized, as Shrader-Frechette suggests?
In what follows, I will examine the concept of a “land community,” focusing on the 
following two questions in particular:
1. Is the concept of “land community” – which, as we shall see, blends ideas that 
would more typically belong to either community ecology or ecosystem ecology 
– hopelessly misguided or outdated?  Does any past or contemporary work 
support such an entity?
2. If the concept of a “land community” can be defended, is it coherent enough to 
be a locus of direct moral obligation or an entity with intrinsic value?3 In other 
words, is it an individual?4  
My ultimate goal is to see if there is a defensible concept of “land community” as an 
individual that is close to Leopold’s stated views; I will argue that there is. This will not 
establish that the land community is a locus of direct moral obligation or an entity with 
intrinsic value, but only establish that it is a candidate for being a morally considerable 
entity (that is, I seek to establish only a necessary condition, not a sufficient one).  But 
rather than solely looking to Clements, Elton, and others to understand Leopold – 
influences are important, but influence is never complete  – let us begin with Leopold 
himself.
2. Land communities as blended community-ecosystems  
Land, Leopold tells us, “is not merely soil; it is a fountain of energy flowing through a 
circuit of soils, plants, and animals. Food chains are the living channels which conduct 
energy upward; death and decay return it to the soil” (1949, 216).  So, Leopold’s concept 
of a land community not only included abiotic components, but also, it was at least 
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3 Here are I set aside the question of whether there is such a thing as intrinsic value (see, e.g., O’Neill 
1992, McShane 2007, and Zimmerman 2015 for general discussion).  The question I am asking is rather, 
assuming that intrinsic value exists, does a land community have the necessary characteristics for 
intrinsic value?  Or, if there is no such thing as intrinsic value, does a land community have the necessary 
characteristics for moral consideration?
4 See Odenbaugh (2007, 2010) and Eliot (2011, 2013) for discussion of ecological communities and 
ecosystems as individuals.  The view I defend here has some similarities to both accounts; see also Levins 
and Lewontin (1980, 1985).  However, these accounts do not address the question of whether of whether 
the two can be combined and whether the combination would be an individual. 
partially characterized in terms of matter and energy flow. This was represented by a 
biotic pyramid that showed the up-circuit flow and the down-circuit flow (See Figure 1).
Figure 1. From Leopold, Aldo. 1939. "A Biotic View of Land." Journal of Forestry 37 (9):
727-730.
However, Leopold also emphasized that a land community is composed of 
interdependent parts.  Drawing on the work of community ecologist Charles Elton (see 
Newton 2006 for discussion), Leopold described a complex tangle of lines of 
dependency for food and other “services” such as shade (See Figure 2).   Food chains 
are sometimes thought of as just an energy conduit, but for Leopold, they also 
represented trophic (feeding) relationships and other types of relationships between 
members of different species.  Leopold thus stressed the interactions between organisms 
and the way in which changes in some species affect other species, and he did so 
throughout “The Land Ethic” and elsewhere (e.g., the consequences of deer 
overbrowsing in the absence of predators in Leopold 1943).
4
Figure 2. From Leopold, Aldo. 1942. "The Role of Wildlife in a Liberal Education." 
Transactions of the Seventh North American Wildlife Conference 8–10 April 1942:485–
489.
Leopold’s land community concept thus emphasizes matter and energy flow through 
organisms and abiotic components and also emphasizes the interdependence among 
organisms and abiotic components.  This is notable because some authors (e.g., Callicott 
and Mumford 1997, Odenbaugh 2007) have differentiated between two types of entities 
and two types of approaches in ecology: ecological communities and a community 
ecology approach on the one hand, ecosystems and an ecosystem ecology approach on 
the other.  It is the former approach, the ecosystem approach, that includes abiotic 
components and invokes matter and energy flow, de-emphasizing (or even 
disregarding) organisms and populations. This approach contrasts with the latter 
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approach, the community ecology approach, which emphasizes interactions between 
organisms.5 
Therefore, Leopold’s “land community” concept combines aspects of the concept of 
“ecological community” as it is typically conceived with aspects of the concept of 
“ecosystem” as it is typically conceived.6 But is this combination tenable? Does it 
complicate the case for the land community as an individual? In order to answer these 
questions, we need to have a better understanding of how Leopold’s land community 
concept is situated in the history of these terms. Was he bucking a cogent scientific 
consensus (was he just a lone wolf?), or is his stance understandable given the historical 
flow of ideas? 
3. Early community and ecosystem concepts
What follows is a potted timeline of central figures in the development of ecological 
community and ecosystem concepts, with an eye toward situating the concept of a 
Leopoldean land community.
Frederic Clements (1916) characterized multispecies groupings as communities.7  He is 
particularly (and somewhat notoriously) known for thinking of communities as 
organisms, but Eliot (2011) has given good reason to think that Clements’ commitment 
to communities as organisms has been overstated.  Regardless, as mentioned above, 
there are traces of thinking of communities as organisms in Leopold (Callicott 1987).
Charles Elton (1927) believed that plant and animals are not mere assemblages of 
species living together, but rather that they form closely-knit communities8 with 
interdependent members comparable to our own human communities; he also believed 
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5 In what follows, I will use the term “land community” when I mean to refer to Leopold’s conception or 
my elaboration of it; when I use just “community” or “ecological community” I am referring instead to its 
meaning in community ecology.
6 To be clear (and as will be discussed further below), not all ecologists conceive of “ecosystem” and 
“community” in these strictly divergent ways; some include population interactions in their study of 
ecosystems and some include abiotic components in their study of communities.  Indeed, I hope to 
debunk the notion that these are always disparate approaches.
7 Lynn Nyhart (2009) traces the idea of a biological community even earlier, to Karl August Möbius in the 
late 19th century, who characterized these living communities (Lebensgemeinschaft) in terms of the 
dependence of their members on one another and on their physical conditions of existence.
8 Odenbaugh (2007, 2010) attributes to Elton an ecosystem concept rather than a community concept, but I 
don’t see evidence for this (see also Hagen 1992).
that these other plant/animal communities include humans. He saw relations between 
animals as largely food relations, giving rise to food chains, the food-cycle, and the 
“pyramid of numbers” (Elton 1927).  Leopold met Elton in 1931 (Meine 2010) and was 
very influenced by him (Newton 2006), not only in terms of Elton’s concept of 
community but also food chains and pyramid of numbers (what Leopold called the 
“land pyramid”). The parallels between the two sets of ideas are obvious and striking.
Arthur Tansley (1935) is generally credited with ecosystem concept.  He argued that 
plants and animals are too different to be considered part of the same community, and 
so rejected the community concept altogether.  He did believe that biomes (sensu 
Clements), “the whole webs of life adjusted to particular complexes of environmental 
factors,” are real ‘wholes,’ often integrated wholes – but he did not believe that they are 
organisms.  Rather, he maintained that biomes together with all of the physical factors 
involved are systems (ecosystems); this, he suggested, is the more fundamental 
conception.  According to Betty Jean Craige (2002), Leopold’s concept of “land” as a 
system with biotic and abiotic components predated Tansley in Leopold’s 1933 Essay, 
“The Conservation Ethic”; according to Callicott (2013), Leopold anticipated many of 
Tansley’s ideas of an ecosystem in his 1939 essay, “Biotic View of Land.”  In other 
words, it appears that Leopold included abiotic components and energy flow 
independently of (and perhaps prior to) Tansley. Thus, Leopold may be less in a Tansley 
tradition and more in an Eltonian one.  Callicott (2013) speculates that Leopold may 
have influenced Lindeman (perhaps through Evelyn Hutchinson) although Lindeman 
doesn’t cite Leopold.
Raymond Lindeman (1942) was a key developer of the ecosystem concept – but for him, 
trophic or “energy-availing” relationships occur within the community.  He thought that 
the discrimination between living organisms as parts of the ‘biotic community’ and 
dead organisms and inorganic nutritives as parts of the ‘environment’ seemed 
“arbitrary and unnatural.”
Eugene Odum (1971), like Lindeman, included a community of interacting organisms 
leading to a flow of energy in his ecosystem concept:9 
... the community cannot exist without the cycling of materials and the flow of 
energy in the ecosystem.  An ecosystem is any unit that includes all of the 
organisms (i.e., the ‘community’) in a given area interacting with the physical 
environment so that a flow of energy leads to clearly defined trophic structure, 
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9 Odenbaugh (2007) says that Odum characterized ecosystems purely in terms of their energetics.  But 
there still seems to be a strong community component to Odum’s concept.
biotic diversity, and material cycles (i.e., exchange of materials between living 
and nonliving parts) within the system (1971, 8).
Perhaps not by accident; he was influenced by Leopold (Craige 2002) and cited Leopold 
explicitly.
So, Odum’s and Lindeman’s ecosystem ideas, by incorporating community elements, are 
actually very much in line with the idea of a Leopoldean land community and could 
thus potentially be used to flesh out Leopold’s concept.  Moreover, the division between 
community ecology and ecosystem ecology is not as clean as, e.g., Callicott and 
Mumford (1997) would have us think.10  The history of the two is entangled (Hagen 
1992), and using a concept drawing from both areas of ecology is not a rogue 
eccentricity of Leopold’s.
But a lot has changed since 1971, flagged by Donald Worster’s (1990) critique of Odum’s 
(and Clements’s) notion that nature moves toward order and harmony:
Ecology is not the same as it was. A rather drastic change has been going on in 
this science of late–a radical shifting away from the thinking of Eugene Odum's 
generation, away from its assumptions of order and predictability, a shifting 
toward what we might call a new ecology of chaos” (Worster 1990, 162).11
And even if Worster’s critique is off the mark, we might still reasonably wonder 
whether there are contemporary candidates for a land community that combine 
community and ecosystem elements, with or without assumptions of stability.  
4. Contemporary community-ecosystem concepts
The short answer is “yes”:  O’Neill (2001), Chapin et al. (2011), Schulze et al. (2005), and 
Hastings and Gross (2012) all combine ecological community and ecosystem elements 
(again, interactions between organisms and matter/energy flow, respectively) in 
describing the entities that they study, as follows.12
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10 A caveat: the practice of community ecology and ecosystem ecology may be more divergent than 
ecologists’ stated concepts of community and ecosystem are.  My focus for now is on the concepts.
11 I don’t fully accept Worster’s characterization of past or contemporary ecology, but I will grant it for the 
purposes of this paper.
12 Biodiversity and ecosystem functioning (BEF) research also seems to embrace a blended community-
ecosystem approach; see discussion and references in Dussault and Bouchard (2016).  
O’Neill (2001) argues that we must recognize the simple empirical fact that ecosystems 
are collections of interacting populations, with component populations shaped by 
natural selection (O’Neill 2001, 3278).  He suggests that the resulting biotic potential 
determines ecosystem dynamics just as much as chemical and physical constraints.  He 
points out that while various problems can be solved by viewing an ecosystem purely 
in terms of functional groups that recover to the same rate processes, feedbacks, and 
complex organization (for example, accounting for situations where species are moving 
in and out of an area over time), such an approach creates its own problems (for 
example, a matter/energy flow focus overlooks ecotones, i.e., zones where one 
vegetation type suddenly changes into another, and also minimizes the role of natural 
selection). In other words, we need to study both community and ecosystem elements.  
He further maintains that the critical property of an ecosystem is not stability, but rather 
the ability to change state in response to a continuous spectrum of change and 
variability (sustainability).
Chapin et al. (2011) maintain the view that ecosystem ecology addresses the interactions 
between organisms and their environment as an integrated system – that it addresses 
the interactions that link biotic systems, of which people are an integral part, with the 
physical systems on which they depend.  On their view, an ecosystem consists of all the 
organisms and the abiotic pools with which they interact; ecosystem processes are the 
transfers of energy and materials from one pool to another.  They state that they are 
taking a “nonequilibrium perspective,” recognizing that: most ecosystems exhibit 
unbalanced inputs and losses; their dynamics are influenced by varying external and 
internal factors; they exhibit no single stable equilibrium; disturbance is a natural 
component of their dynamics; and human activities exert a pervasive influence.  So, 
although the definition of ecosystem that Chapin et al. provide is a bit unfocused, they 
do allow for interaction together with a nonequilibrium perspective, and also usefully 
distinguish the processes of an ecosystem from what an ecosystem is.
Schulze et al. (2011) characterize ecosystems as networks of interrelations between 
organisms and their environment in a defined space.  They assert that the limits of an 
ecosystem must extend so far that the essential parts of material turnover per ground 
area (e.g., carbon assimilation, nitrogen mineralization, formation of ground water, etc.) 
are taken into account quantitatively.  This suggests that there can be mistaken ways of 
characterizing the boundaries of an ecosystem.  More on this point later.
Hastings and Gross (2012) characterize an ecosystem as a system composed of both the 
organisms (animal, plant, microbe) and the abiotic environment, and all interactions 
among and between these components.  On the other hand, they characterize an 
ecosystem model as a model designed to capture the pools and fluxes of mass (and 
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sometimes energy) in an ecosystem. This nicely separates what an ecosystem is from the 
particular aspects of an ecosystem (flow of materials and energy) that an ecologist 
might study.
In summary, here are some important and useful insights that can be drawn from these 
contemporary ecologists who combine community and ecosystem approaches.  First, 
both the “matter/energy flow”-alone approach creates problems as does the 
“population interaction”-alone approach (O’Neill 2001).  Second, sustainability, rather 
than stability, may be the relevant property (O’Neill 2001), so that the worries that 
Worster raises become moot; Chapin et al. (2011) also explicitly advocate for a 
nonequilibrium approach.  Third, what an ecosystem is may be different from its 
processes (Chapin et al. 2011) and its models (Hastings and Gross 2012).  Fourth, some 
purported boundaries may exclude relevant processes and thus be inappropriate 
(Schulze et al. 2005). Fifth, these ecologists collectively challenge the picture of 
community ecology and ecosystem ecology as distinct approaches.
5. Potential problems with a combined community-ecosystem concept
But there are some potential problems with a combined community-ecosystem 
approach, flagged even by those who endorse such an approach.  Post et al. (2007) 
maintain that boundaries are set by discontinuities or steep gradients in the flux and 
flow of material and energy and/or by discontinuities or steep gradients in interactions 
between populations of different species.  However, they point out that whereas some 
systems are well-bounded (which is not to say “closed”), others are open (Post et al. 2007). 
In well-bounded systems (e.g., lakes, islands) these two criteria coincide – and coincide 
with physical boundaries as well – making delineating ecosystem boundaries relatively 
straightforward.  In such systems, “...interactions among organisms are typically 
stronger and cycling of material and energy is typically tighter within than across the 
physical boundaries of these ecosystems” (Post et al. 2007, 115).  On the other hand, in 
open systems (e.g., most terrestrial habitats, estuaries, and streams), the two approaches 
do not coincide, as when resources come from areas where species are not interacting 
(e.g., upstream).  The problem, then, is how to understand the boundaries of open 
systems.  As was indicated in Chapter 1 of this volume (check with editors), one 
important aspect of individuality is demarcating an individual from other things and 
environments.  In biology, abiotic elements are often considered “the environment,” but 
with the land community, the abiotic components are part of the entity, so the question 
is even more challenging than usual.
Post et al. (2007) describe various challenging scenarios for understanding the 
boundaries of open systems.  Suppose, for example, large “inputs” are coming from the 
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“outside” at short temporal scales, as is the case when, for example, highly mobile 
organisms such as geese and migrating fish move large amount of nutrients around the 
landscape, with lakes, wetlands, and streams receiving these nutrients.13 Then we 
should recognize that the system is larger than we had initially thought.  Alternatively, 
suppose that “internal” cycling of material/energy is stronger than “external” inputs, as 
is the case when, for example, a watershed is visited by few mobile organisms or when 
it has a very high productivity. Then we should consider “internal” cycling to dictate 
the boundary.
Post et al. conclude: “In open ecosystems where there is little or no congruence among 
physical and functional boundaries... each different question may dictate very different 
definitions of ecosystem boundaries” (2007, 122).  Although this is an interesting 
position worth considering, it doesn’t seem to me that Post and colleagues have made 
the case for it.  That is, they don’t seem to have described situations where different 
questions would indicate different boundaries; on the contrary, as I describe in the 
preceding paragraph, they seem to have offered solutions to such cases where one 
might think that such a problem arose.  Perhaps they mean simply to suggest, as they 
suggest at various points in the paper, that different temporal scales might affect 
whether we consider a system to be open or well-bounded, with all systems being open 
given a long enough time scale.  While this is an important consideration, and while 
relevant time scale needs to be factored into questions concerning boundaries, it does 
not seem to follow that different questions dictate different system boundaries.  To put 
the point another way, it seems that they have offered a scheme for understanding how, 
given a time scale, system boundaries ought to be characterized.
But even taking Post et al.’s stated conclusion at face value, a question remains: are 
open systems where different questions dictate different ecosystem definitions and 
different ecosystem boundaries coherent enough to be entities that we owe direct 
obligations to or to be entities that have intrinsic value?  (This is concern (v) above). This 
question has an ontological component and an ethical component, which I will discuss 
in turn.  
In order address the ontological component, namely, the status of interest-relative 
entities, it will be instructive to consider similar views.   Callicott likewise holds that 
ecosystems “are in effect defined, both spatially and temporally, by the ecological 
question posed” (2013, 3), yet he maintains that they are “real, existing entities” (2013, 
94) – at least in part.  That is, he maintains that “when we come to isolate them, to 
11
13 O’Neill et al. (1986) imagine a similar situation, but where the community is more extensive than the 
matter/energy flows.
bound them, for purposes of ecological study, we partly create them,” similar to the 
way, he says, that “electrons emerge fully into existence when quantum physicists 
measure them” (2013, 41).  Setting aside questions about his interpretation of physics 
and the strangeness of this analogy, it is difficult to understand what Callicott means.  
Does he mean that in the absence of investigators, there really are no ecosystems or 
communities, at least not in a full sense?  Perhaps not, but then it seems as though one 
cannot continue to defend ecosystems and communities as individuals or as “real, 
existing entities.” 
Eliot (2013) offers a more sophisticated version of the argument that our interests 
partially determine whether something is a community.  According to Eliot, boundaries 
are determined by the set of causal relations relevant to some interest; furthermore, a 
community is “a real object, in so far as its component populations are connected by a 
particular kind of causal connection” (2013, 8).   Odenbaugh (2010) similarly claims that 
different causal relations may pick out different ecosystems, although he does not tie 
this claim to our human interests.  However, we don’t seem to have such loose causal 
relation requirements for other putative individuals, such as organisms.14  For example, 
in the human body “circulates blood” does not fully coincide in physical space with 
“circulates oxygen,” yet we think of those causal relations as picking out the same 
individual (the same organism), not two different individuals.  This is presumably 
because the system that circulates blood and the system that circulates oxygen are 
tightly interconnected with other systems from which they are not fully separable.  So, 
we should at least consider whether the same is true for putative communities/
ecosystems.
Turning to the ethical component of the question, if (contra to what I argued above) 
Callicott’s understanding of the ontology is correct, then it seems like the moral 
considerability of an ecosystem is dependent on an ecologist studying it.  If the 
ecosystem loses moral considerability (indeed, ceases to fully be an ecosystem) when it 
is not being studied, then that is a weak notion of moral considerability indeed.  So, 
Callicott’s understanding of “ecosystem” is insufficient for his (and our) ethical 
purposes, making a continued search for a possible workable alternative desirable.
On the other hand, Eliot’s and Odenbaugh’s alternative approaches toward 
characterizing communities/ecosystems, which are ultimately grounded in causal 
relations, also run into problems concerning moral considerability.  Here, the problem 
arises because of the multiplicity of possible boundaries.  To be clear, the worry here is 
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14 This is not to deny that characterizing organisms is without challenges (see, e.g., Dupré 2010 and Clarke 
2011 for some of the complications), just to suggest that organisms are often taken to be prototypical 
individuals, thus making it reasonable to argue using them as analogy.  
not that boundaries may be a bit fuzzy, since surely many real, existing entities have 
fuzzy boundaries; e.g., to be an organism is to constantly lose and gain cells, yet human 
organisms are surely “real, existing entities.”  (We thus ought not be surprised when 
land communities turn out to have fuzzy boundaries as well, as they do).  Rather, the 
problem is one (as highlighted by Russow 1981 for the case of species) of how many 
entities there are.  Considering a given geographical area, do we have one land 
community, two land communities, or more?   Perhaps a lack of a definitive answer to 
that question is not problematic on its own, but what if different ways of drawing 
boundaries for a given geographical area cross-cut each other, so that in some cases we 
have one land community as a subset of another, whereas with others, one land 
community overlaps with another?  It makes it unclear as to what we have moral 
obligations to, especially if we have to make choices between different purported land 
communities.  Can we eliminate or add moral obligations simply by asking different 
sorts of scientific questions?  Are all possible ways of drawing boundaries equally 
legitimate?  It would seem that there are an infinite number of possible ways of drawing 
boundaries for a given geographic area;15 do our moral obligations shift with each 
possible drawing?  That seems untenable and unworkable.
Moreover, would it be wise to try to treat purported land communities well while 
failing to consider some of the population interactions or energy flows relevant to their 
sustainability? It seems as though one would run into practical problems if one did so.  
To use the analogy of the human body again, it would be akin to trying to
benefit one’s arm muscles without consideration of one’s heart and lungs; eventually, 
the arms will fail when the body fails from ill health.  So again, we ought to consider 
more closely the question of whether there are ways that boundaries of open systems 
can be delineated in a more systematic and defensible way.16
6. Response to problems
Indeed, there seem to be (at least) three ways of handling open systems, systems where 
the spatial area of the densely interacting populations is larger than that of the dense 
matter/energy flow – or vice versa:  
One possibility is that the land community exists within the larger of the two areas.  In other 
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15 Perhaps Post et al, Callicott, Eliot, and/or Odenbaugh have some way of limiting the questions asked 
and the boundaries drawn, but I am not sure what those would be given what they have said.
16 To my knowledge, Leopold did not address the question of how to determine the boundaries of land 
communities.  Thus, my hope here is to develop an account that is Leopoldean in spirit, with land 
communities as individuals, emphasizing interdependencies between organisms. 
words, we always “go big”; if the spatial area of the densely interacting populations is 
larger than that of the dense matter/energy flow, the land community consists of the 
area covered by the densely interacting populations, whereas if the area of the dense 
matter/energy flow is larger than that of the densely interacting populations, the land 
community consists of the area covered by the dense matter/energy flow.  However, a 
possible problem with this approach is that we would lose the concept of the ecosystem 
as a focal level, going beyond locales that lend themselves to concrete study in the field 
– perhaps to biomes (Currie 2011).  This doesn’t strike me as a devastating objection – 
we could just acknowledge that what we study is always a subset of the entity itself – 
but it the objection is worth taking seriously, especially if there are better alternatives.
A second possibility is that the land community exists within the smaller of the two areas.  In 
other words, we always “go small”; if the spatial area of the densely interacting 
populations is smaller than that of the dense matter/energy flow, the land community 
consists of the area covered by the densely interacting populations, whereas if the area 
of the dense matter/energy flow is smaller than that of the densely interacting 
populations, the land community consists of the area covered by the dense matter/
energy flow. The problem with this proposal is that it might exclude causally relevant 
factors for the future states of populations and abiotic components and thus give a 
misleading picture that would be subject to error, making this proposal completely 
untenable, in my view.
A third possibility is that the land community includes interactions or matter/energy flows 
from the larger area if and only if those interactions or matter/energy flows are stronger or larger 
than those of the smaller area. This, in essence, seems to be how Post et al. handled cases 
such as those where mobile organisms brought large amounts of nutrients into lakes, 
wetlands, and streams.  This is the solution that I am inclined to accept; it promises to 
preserve land communities as objects of study while taking into account most of the 
important causal processes that affect the land community’s future (“most of” because, 
since no biological system is closed, there is always the potential for a rare but strong 
causal influence from the outside).
Here it might be objected that we do not even have sufficient congruence to constitute 
ecological communities and ecosystems, much less congruence between ecological 
communities and ecosystems.  Kim Sterelny, for example, raises concerns about the lack 
of congruence within purported ecological communities, using Black Mountain (a bush 
reserve near Australian National University) as an example:
‘Black Mountain’ names a quite heterogeneous region of about 10 square 
kilometers with gentle variation from patch to patch. As a consequence of these 
14
gradual changes in character, the different populations might not be correlated. 
A local brushtail possum population may overlap with a local ringtail possum 
population, a local boobook owl population, a greater glider population, and a 
number of eucalyptus populations. For on Black Mountain, there are no sharp 
changes that matter to all of these species, keeping local populations congruent 
with one another (Sterelny 2006, 225).
However, this lack of congruence does not invalidate the third solution to the problem 
of boundaries.  It is not necessary that all the populations of a community be located in 
the same place; what matters is that there is there is continuity of causal interaction 
across the populations, even if, for example, the local ringtail population is not 
interacting with the local boobook owl population.  As long as the interactions among 
the listed populations are stronger than other, “external” interactions, they are all part of 
the community.  This is analogous to the case of a continuous population (Millstein 
2010), where the endpoints of a population spread over space do not interact with each 
other even though there is interaction among the organisms across the entire space, 
forming one population.  And, contra Lean (2015), the order in which we consider the 
causal interactions between populations does not matter for our characterization of 
them; all of the interactions must be considered, so the result will be the same whether 
we start with brushtail possums or one of the eucalyptus populations.
Moreover, a quick comparison to organisms shows that the parts of an individual need 
not be congruent; just as a heart muscle and a leg muscle are not congruent, the 
populations (the “parts”) of a community need not be congruent.17 The objection is 
puzzling.
Sterleny raises a further sort of worry about drawing boundaries for an interactionist 
account of ecological communities specifically:18
...the interaction patterns of different components of putative communities may 
well not coincide. Even if communities are networks of interacting populations, 
they are typically demographically open. Migrants move in and out of most 
habitat patches. As we saw in Section 2, such movements are likely to have 
stabilizing effects. We have two populations rather than one if organisms of the 
same type are related by metapopulation dynamics rather than competition. The 
echidnas in Black Mountain are part of a different population, and hence a 
different community from the echidnas on the O’Connor Ridge (about a 
15
17 Thanks to Gregory Mikkleson for this point.
18 Sterelny is responding to Levins and Lewontin (1985).
kilometer to the north) if they are a source population for the O’Connor Ridge 
echidnas. They then buffer that group against population collapses rather than 
competing with them for scarce resources. Prima facie, though, there is not much 
reason to expect the dynamics of echidna populations to match those of larger 
and more mobile organisms, or those of smaller and less mobile ones (Sterelny 
2006, 217).
Again, however, I do not see that this is an insurmountable objection.19  If we have 
correctly identified the echidnas as forming a metapopulation, then the interactions 
between those two populations are rare (see Millstein 2010 for a discussion of the 
metapopulation concept).  So, even though these rare interactions may sometimes turn 
out to be significant (as in the case that Sterelny describes, where one population 
recolonizes a location where another population has gone extinct or nearly extinct), 
there is no difficulty in saying that the echidnas in Black Mountain are part of one 
community and the echidnas on the O’Connor Ridge are part of another.  They still 
represent a situation where there are continuous interactions among Black Mountain 
populations and among O’Connor Ridge populations with discontinuities between – 
discontinuities do not imply that there are no interactions, only that they are fewer and 
weaker.  And if it were to turn out, contra to supposition, that there were significant 
migrations and interactions between the echidnas in Black Mountain and the echidnas 
on the O’Connor Ridge, then we have misidentified the echidnas as a metapopulation; 
they would instead be a patchy population (see Millstein 2010), and we would then 
have a case for considering all of the populations (consisting of different species) of 
O’Connor Ridge and Black Mountain to be one community (since, again, it is not 
required, as discussed in my response to the first of Sterelny’s objections, that every 
population interact with every other population or that they be in the same place).
I have focused on the objection that the populations within ecological communities lack 
sufficient congruence for us to identify their boundaries, but the same sort of responses 
can be made to those who might claim that the matter/energy flows of ecosystems lack 
congruence.  Individuality does not require location in the same space; the University of 
California, Davis is an individual even though part of it is in Davis, part is in 
Sacramento, and part is in Bodega Bay.  So, there can be, say, flow of nutrient X in one 
area and flow of nutrient Y in another, but those flows would be part of the same 
ecosystem so long as there is continuity of flow between them.  
Recall, however, that the goal of this paper is not to defend an ecological community 
concept or an ecosystem concept per se, but rather to defend a combined ecological 
16
19 In fairness, Sterelny does admit that “It is hard to tell just how serious this problem is” (2006, 225).
community-ecosystem concept, i.e., a land community.  And I have already described 
how to address lack of congruence between an ecological community and an ecosystem: 
the land community includes interactions or matter/energy flows from the larger area if 
and only if those interactions or matter/energy flows are stronger or larger than those 
of the smaller area.
7. Toward a Leopoldean Land Community Concept
Insights from sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 lead me to propose:
A Leopoldean land community consists of populations20 of different species 
interacting with each other and with their abiotic environment, creating 
interdependencies between organisms; these survival-relevant interactions produce 
a flow of energy and materials between biotic components and between biotic 
components and abiotic components (and vice versa).  
Let me elaborate on this proposal a bit more.
Survival-relevant interactions between the populations include: Competition for scarce 
resources, predator/prey, parasite/host, pollinator/pollinated, provision of shade or 
shelter.  Note that this list echoes Leopold’s own typology of dependencies, as shown in 
Figure 2: predations, exploitations, services, and parasitisms.  Relevant flows of materials 
and energy include: Primary production (photosynthesis, chemosynthesis), secondary 
production, evapotranspiration, decomposition, nutrient cycling.  These are not meant 
to be controversial, or even original, parts of my proposal; they are simply the typical 
interactions and material/energy flows identified by ecologists.  Survival-relevant 
interactions between the populations can produce flows of materials and energy, but 
flows of material and energy can also produce or affect survival-relevant interactions 
between populations.  Food webs are of particular importance to a combined 
community-ecosystem approach because they can represent species interactions within 
a community and energy flow through those species (Post et al. 2007); they are thus of 
particular importance to a land community.
17
20 Too often (e.g., O’Neill 2001, Odenbaugh 2007, Post et al. 2007) communities are spoken of as being 
composed of species and species interactions, but this is loose language (i.e., I don’t think any of these 
authors actually believe that the entire species need be present or interacting).  A species may be 
composed of multiple populations, not all of which are part of the same community.  This is true even if 
the populations form a metapopulation, that is, if they are weakly connected (Millstein 2010).  Damuth’s 
(1985) term “avatar,” referring to the population of a species found in a particular community, would be 
appropriate here.
Land community boundaries21 for well-bounded systems are where discontinuities or 
steep gradients in the flow of material and energy coincide with discontinuities or steep 
gradients in species interactions. Land community boundaries for open systems are at a 
minimum delineated by the smaller of the two types of discontinuities or steep 
gradients, including the more extensive interactions or matter/energy flows if and only if 
those interactions or matter/energy flows are stronger or larger than those of the 
smaller area. This approach has the advantage of including all significant causally 
relevant factors for the future states of populations and abiotic components 
(interdependencies).  It may mean that there are fewer land communities than one 
might have thought; however, I am not sure that this is a problem. Ecologists may 
reasonably choose to study subsets (including particular types of interactions or 
particular matter or energy flows) of these for various pragmatic reasons, but such 
choices do not affect the ontology of land communities.
Although here I have drawn on Post et al. (2007) in using discontinuities or steep 
gradients to identify  boundaries, this approach is similar to Simon’s (2002) account of 
“nearly complete decomposability,” which I have used elsewhere in characterizing the 
concept of population (Millstein 2009, 2010).  It is different from Simon’s approach in 
focusing on the strength of interactions – which can be understood as the size of the 
effect that changes in one population produce in another population – rather than their 
rate.  This difference should not be seen as a crucial one; differences in the rate of 
interactions would likewise be relevant for boundaries of land communities.  This 
approach has the added benefit of addressing Eliot’s (2011) concern that interactions 
alone do not offer a basis for differentiating particular communities (in context, he is 
criticizing Odenbaugh’s interactionist account of communities) from the global 
community of all organisms if all or most organisms are connected by interactions.  On 
the view defended here, weak, small, or infrequent interactions would not suffice to add 
an “(n + 1)th” population to a land community.  Moreover, even if a strongly negative 
interacting population (say, a population of super-predators like the snakehead fish in 
the Potomac River System; see Odenkirk and Owens 2007) were added to a land 
community or a strongly positive interacting keystone population (say, wolves in 
Yellowstone; see Ripple and Beschta 2007) were eliminated from a land community, as 
long as other interacting populations persist the land community persists.  It might not 
persist in a healthy state (which is where conservationist concerns would enter in), but 
it persists; thus, the account I have proposed here is not subject to the “(n + 1)th” or “(n 
- 1)th” problems that Eliot (2011) describes. 
The composition of species in a land community may change over time; moreover, the 
18
21 Note that land community boundaries are fuzzy rather than sharp.
populations that it contains may evolve over time.  The land community is the same 
entity if, and only if, there is continuity of interaction and material/energy flow within 
the entity through time.22  Thus, since their members may change, land communities 
may or may not be stable in the sense of “stasis” or “equilibrium.”  Sustainability 
(similar to what Leopold meant by stability or land health – see Newton 2006) may be a 
more pertinent trait or feature (O’Neill 2001).  For example, Leopold (1944) traced four 
epochs within Southwestern Wisconsin,23 but his concern was land health in the face of 
different practices, not change of species (although he was concerned that the latter 
often negatively affected the former, while acknowledging many cases in which it did 
not do so). 
A land community so described would be an individual in the Ghiselin-Hull sense 
(see, e.g., Ghiselin 1974, 1997; Hull 1976, 1978)24; it would:
• Be a particular thing, not a class; it would be a spatiotemporally restricted entity (that 
is, it is located in a particular place and time, even if it is not continuous in space).
• Not merely be an assemblage; it would be an integrated, cohesive entity because of 
the causal interactions among the parts, giving the parts (to some extent) a shared 
fate.  (This is the most important criterion, in my view; recall Leopold’s claim that 
the components of the land community have a collective as well as separate 
welfare).
• Have beginnings and endings in time.
• Be continuous through time, allowing for change over time.
This characterization challenges the so-called “Gleasonian” picture of communities as 
mere coincidental assemblages of whatever organisms happen to be located in a 
particular place at a particular time.  Some philosophers, (e.g., Regan 1983) cast doubt 
on the idea that mere “collections” can have moral rights, so this is a salient point.  
While it is an empirical question as to whether there are causal interactions among 
19
22 See Odenbaugh (2007) on this point with respect to the ecological community concept.  See also 
Millstein (2015); although I lack the space to fully develop the ideas here, I would use a similar approach 
to thinking about land communities through time as I do in that paper concerning thinking about 
populations through time.  However, I suspect that one difference will be that whereas populations come 
into existence and go out of existence fairly frequently, that land communities do so only relatively rarely.  
There would have to be a complete loss of continuity for a land community to go “extinct.”  On the other 
hand, in contemporary times new land communities might most commonly be formed by human-caused 
splitting of an existing land community.
23 Fur trade epoch, 1680-1832; Fire epoch, 1750-1850; Wheat epoch, 1832-1878; Dairy epoch, 1872-(his) 
present
24 See also Hamilton et al. (2009) and Millstein (2009).
populations of different species that affect their survival (and so, an empirical question 
as to whether there are land communities in the sense I have described) or whether they 
are mere assemblages, there is certainly plenty of evidence (more than I could 
reasonably capture here) that such causal interactions exist.  Indeed, Eliot (2011) argues 
persuasively that Gleason has been interpreted too radically, noting that “Every 
ecologist, including Gleason, recognizes interactions among organisms, including that 
some require others, to survive” (Eliot 2011, 102).  Once one considers, e.g., that trophic 
interactions (which affect both the eaten and the eater) are sufficient, it becomes 
virtually impossible to deny the existence of survival-relevant interactions. And recent 
work suggests that these and other interactions are important enough that order and 
timing of species immigration during community assembly can affect species 
composition and abundances (Fukami 2015).  On other other hand, if Gleason turns out 
to have been right that the compositions of species in an area change frequently, nothing 
I have argued for is challenged here, since it is the causal interactions that are essential 
to the land community’s individuality, and not any particular composition of species.
On this view, individuality comes in degrees, especially with respect to integration, 
eliminating the need for a separate term for “wholes” (see Odenbaugh 2007).  Here I set 
aside the question of whether the land community is an organism or whether it is a unit 
of selection,25 both of which bring additional complications. I also set aside questions 
that Sterelny (2006) raises over whether communities are “internally regulated” or the 
extent to which they have emergent properties; even Sterelny acknowledges:
Of course local populations do not live completely independently of one another. 
Life at Black Mountain is diffusely interdependent; the organisms that live there 
are not autonomous islands of life. Plants often depend on animals for 
pollination and seed dispersal, on symbiotic partners for crucial nutrients, and 
on detrivores for nutrient cycling. Consumer guilds—herbivores and carnivores
—are obviously dependent on other organisms (Sterelny 2006, 216)
This interdependence, stressed by Leopold in “The Land Ethic” and elsewhere, is the 
essential piece needed to make the case for the individuality of land communities. 
Organismality, internal regulation, being a unit of selection, and/or emergent properties 
might make for a more “robust” individuality, but they are not necessary for it.  That is, 
they are not necessary for differentiating an individual from an abstract type or a mere 
set or a mere assemblage.  Moreover, the concept of individuality relied on here is 
20
25 That is, I am not considering whether the land community satisfies a criterion of evolutionary 
individuality, as do, e.g., Clarke (2011) and Ereshefsky and Pedroso (2015).  Nothing I have said in this 
paper presupposes that land communities are units of selection; interdependence between organisms can 
evolve via co-evolution of populations.
sufficient to pick out an entity that can be distinguished from other entities of its type 
and which persists in time, allowing for it to be a candidate for direct moral obligation 
and intrinsic value.
7. Conclusions
There are, admittedly, further issues to be worked out.  For example, does it matter 
whether the interactions that compose the land community are between populations, or 
are interactions between the populations’ organisms sufficient? If it does matter, are 
interactions such as predator/prey interactions genuinely population-level rather than 
organism-level?  Also, is there a general way to specify these interactions? Eliot (2011) 
suggests that Odenbaugh’s (2007) specification that the interactions be “ecological” or 
“biotic” is vague.  In Section 6, I specified that the interactions should be population-
level survival interactions.  Is that sufficient to address Eliot’s concern about vagueness? 
Another sort of worry is whether I have left open the possibility of land communities at 
different scales; one might think, for example, that there could be local land 
communities, regional land communities, etc. If my account cannot accommodate this 
possibility, is that a problem?  Perhaps not; ecologists speak of meta-communities 
(Leibold et al. 2004); there might be meta-land communities or meta-meta-land-
communities.  
Nonetheless, I hope to have shown that there is some reason to think that a Leopoldean 
concept of a land community is consistent with some contemporary ecology, to have 
given a more precise characterization of it, and to have demonstrated that if any such 
entity exists in the world, it would be an individual.  If this is correct, then a Leopoldean 
land community is at least a candidate for direct moral obligation and intrinsic value; 
the next step would be to show not only that it has the necessary characteristics for 
direct moral obligation and intrinsic value, but also that it has sufficient ones.  To that 
question I leave a future work.
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